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ANNUAL REPORT / 1991-1992 
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
SEC Practice Section
American Institute o f 
Certified Public Accountants
This is a summary o f the Public Oversight Board's fourteenth annual report. The complete 1991-1992 annual report has been issued in combination w ith the SEC 
Practice Section. Copies are available by w riting to the offices o f the Public Oversight Board.
Litigation—A Crisis and An Opportunity
In the estimation of the leadership of the accounting profession, the 
present flood of litigation assailing accounting firms and the multi­
million dollar judgments and settlements resulting constitute a grave 
danger to the continued viability of the accounting profession as it 
presently exists and to its ability to perform its vital function of 
providing assurances of the integrity of financial information relied 
upon by investors and creditors.
While the Public Oversight Board’s most immediate responsibil­
ity is oversight of the programs of the SEC Practice Section of the 
AICPA’s Division for CPA firms, it believes—and has repeatedly 
said—that it cannot be indifferent to any situation or occurrence 
that may adversely affect the integrity, the utility and the reliability 
of the audit function or the ability of members of the accounting 
profession to perform that function.
In the face of the concerns of the profession, and our own 
perception of the significance of the litigation against accounting 
firms, the Board determined it cannot be a mere spectator, but must 
assess this problem in the light of the public interest. The Board’s 
responsibility is to the public; that responsibility cannot be sepa­
rated from concern with the fate of the accounting profession and its 
ability to continue to provide quality audit services.
Thus, the Board has carefully studied the accounting profes­
sion’s litigation problem to determine whether it may adversely af­
fect the public interest. To complete its study, members of the Board 
and its full-time staff met for two days in a setting that permitted an 
uninterrupted examination of the accounting profession’s liability 
concerns in the context of its current and prospective performance 
of the audit function. Members of our staff, whose professional 
backgrounds and continuing oversight activities uniquely equip 
them to do so, spent considerable time in developing an appropriate 
agenda. To reduce the possibility of overlooking important matters, 
we invited thoughtful and provocative thinkers who share our con­
cerns about the accounting profession but who approach them from 
various backgrounds and positions to provide us with suggestions 
about the matters that should be discussed. We are deeply indebted 
to them for sharing their insights and their experience with the 
Board and staff.
The Board concluded that the public interest is adversely af­
fected by the present litigation threat confronting the profession. 
The reasons for this conclusion will be set forth in detail in a special 
report which the Board expects to publish early in 1993. In brief, 
these include the problems which would flow from the failure of a 
major firm; the impact of litigation on recruitment and retention of 
trained and competent personnel; the unwillingness of firms to as­
sume responsibility for the audit of smaller firms and firms in their 
early stages which pose greater risks of failure; the hesitancy of 
the accounting profession to assume new responsibilities because of 
litigation fears; and the possibility that firms may eventually be un­
willing to give the assurances they have traditionally provided to 
American industry, its investors and its creditors.
However, the Board concluded that the litigation problem 
cannot be considered apart from the widespread feeling in many 
quarters that independent auditors as a group have not met either 
their audit responsibilities or the expectations of investors and 
creditors as fully as they should. Concurrently with efforts to secure 
legislation that will sensibly limit the exposure of the profession to 
liabilities that exceed the extent of their responsibilities, we believe 
the profession must also address these beliefs concerning the ade­
quacy of auditor performance.
As we have studied this public concern, it appears it may stem 
from a number of circumstances. For the moment, it appears to us
the principal ones are these. The first is the alleged failure of gener­
ally accepted accounting principles to provide financial statements 
that understandably and realistically present financial condition, 
results of operations, and the probability of continuing viability for 
the reporting company. The failure of accountants to communicate 
clearly to the general public the nature and extent of assurance an 
audit can provide to readers of financial statements is the other, and 
particularly the limited extent of that assurance about some asser­
tions imbedded in financial statements. Independent accountants do 
sometimes fail to perform their audit function in an exemplary man­
ner. Far more often, however, they are accused and held responsible 
for events and conditions beyond their ability to foresee or forestall.
We believe the task of restoring public confidence in the profes­
sion and its willingness to face its responsibilities requires that the 
profession find a means of going beyond what the SEC Practice 
Section’s Quality Control Inquiry Committee presently does— 
inquire whether litigation against a firm indicates a quality control 
problem. The purpose of such expanded inquiry would be to accumu­
late knowledge which would permit the refinement of accounting 
principles and auditing standards in the light of hard experience; 
and also to provide guidance to all practitioners about risks that they 
should address in planning and performing audits. This must be done 
without jeopardizing the litigation posture of firms charged with 
audit failures. To do so will require imagination and courage. We are 
confident means can be found to do it.
The accounting profession’s present self-regulatory program has 
already had a profound and exemplary impact on the quality of inde­
pendent auditing in this country. We are confident that program can 
be strengthened further. The profession has been remarkably respon­
sive to suggestions for its improvement, and we are confident that it 
will accept suggestions for further improvement if these are realistic.
In the near future, we expect to propose to the leadership of the 
profession, regulators, and legislators measures that we think will 
strengthen both the quality of audit performance and the reality of 
auditor responsibility. In return we hope and expect that the present 
unfair and unconscionable burdens of class action litigation against 
accountants should be mitigated materially.
Our chairman, Mr. A. A. Sommer, Jr., recently offered a sugges­
tion for a possible course of action for the Board and the profession 
in a speech to the American Accounting Association on “ The Chal­
lenge of Accountability.’ ’ A portion of Mr. Sommer’s remarks are 
included in the POB Commentary on the Accounting Profession 
section of this report.
About the SECPS and the POB
The SEC Practice Section (SECPS) imposes membership require­
ments and administers two fundamental programs to ensure that 
SEC registrants are audited by accounting firms with adequate qual­
ity control systems: (1) peer review, through which Section members 
have their practices reviewed every three years by other accoun­
tants, and (2) quality control inquiry, which reviews allegations of 
audit failure involving a publicly-held entity contained in litigation 
filed against member firms to determine if the firms’ quality control 
systems require corrective measures.
The Public Oversight Board (POB) is an autonomous body con­
sisting of five members with a broad spectrum of business, profes­
sional, regulatory and legislative experience that oversees the 
SECPS activities. The Board’s primary responsibility is to safeguard 
the public interest (1) when the SECPS sets, revises and enforces 
standards, membership requirements, rules and procedures, and (2) 
when the Section’s committees consider the results of individual
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peer reviews and the possible implications of litigation alleging audit 
failure. As mentioned earlier, the Board believes its responsibilities 
also include the monitoring of all matters and developments which 
may affect the integrity of the audit process and, where appropriate, 
remarking upon them. To preserve its independence, the Board 
appoints its own members, chairman and staff, sets its own compen­
sation, and establishes its own operating procedures.
Board Activities
The Board maintains active relationships with organizations that 
scrutinize the profession, including the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the General Accounting Office, the Auditing Standards 
Board, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. In its deliber­
ations, the Board carefully considers all comments, reports and pro­
posals that these bodies and authorities publish which may affect 
the profession.
Altogether, the Board met seven times this year. In connection 
with these meetings, the Board met with the Comptroller-General of 
the U.S., the Chief Accountant of the SEC, the President of the 
Financial Accounting Foundation, the general counsels of two of the 
largest SECPS member firms, the Planning Committee of the SECPS, 
and the Chairman, President and other officials of the AICPA. The 
Board also held three “ outreach programs” at which it met with 
leaders of large and small SECPS member firms who are members of 
the Wisconsin, California, and Pennsylvania societies of CPAs. All 
these discussions helped shape the Board’s views on a number of 
topics relating to the SECPS self-regulatory programs as well as 
other matters relating to audit quality.
Scope of POB Oversight of 1991 Peer Reviews by 
Number of SEC Registrants Audited by Reviewed Firm
  Visitation and   Workpaper   Report
Workpaper Review Review Review
  Total Visitation   Total   Total Total
and Workpaper Review Workpaper Review Report Review All Firms
113 183 78 374
Last year the Board provided extensive suggestions to the Com­
mittee on Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) on its initial exposure draft “ Internal Control-Integrated 
Framework.”  In April 1992, representatives of the Board met with 
representatives of COSO to express two continuing concerns the 
Board has with the February 1992 revised draft report exposed for 
public comment. First, the February draft seems to exempt small 
public companies from the need to have audit committees as a part of 
their corporate governance structure. Our research of Quality Con­
trol Inquiry Committee cases suggests that there is a higher inci­
dence of fraudulent financial reporting among smaller public compa­
nies which suggests that these entities would benefit from improved 
corporate governance provided by independent directors overseeing 
the financial reporting process. The final report of COSO issued in 
September 1992 has been revised to point out the critical importance 
of independent directors in overseeing the financial reporting pro­
cess of smaller and mid-size public entities.
Our second concern is that COSO’s guidance in both its February 
draft and its final report on reporting to external parties about the 
quality of an entity’s internal controls will likely result in “ boiler­
plate” assurances being provided as only the existence of material 
weaknesses need be reported. The occurrence of material weak­
nesses are relatively infrequent and the material weakness concept 
does not apply to some of the components of internal control identi­
fied in the COSO report. The Board believes that when significant 
weaknesses exist, as they often do, below the material weakness 
threshold in any component of internal control their existence 
should be acknowledged in a report to external parties.
To maintain the comprehensiveness of its oversight activities in 
the face of a record number of SECPS peer reviews, the majority of 
which were initial reviews of firms which joined pursuant to the
1990 AICPA bylaw change mandating membership in the SECPS for 
all firms in the AICPA that audit SEC clients, the Board trained and 
supervised seven retired partners from SECPS member firms, who 
assisted the four permanent staff members in the oversight of the
1991 peer review program. The part-time staff reside in geographic 
regions with high densities of member firms, which helped to mini­
mize the costs associated with oversight of the program. The Board 
continues to use part-time staff in 1992.
It is the Board’s opinion, based on its intensive oversight, that 
the SECPS self-regulatory program contributes significantly to the 
quality of auditing in the U.S., particularly the quality of public 
company audits. The Board is pleased that the SEC shares this view.
The POB is proud to report that this year’s recipient of the John 
J . McCloy Award for Outstanding Contributions to Audit Excellence 
was Ms. Barbara Franklin, who is currently the U.S. Secretary of 
Commerce. The presentation was made in January before she as­
sumed her present office in recognition of her outstanding contribu­
tions to the improvement of audit quality in this country. She has 
served as a director of several major U.S. corporations, regularly 
serving on their audit committees and frequently as chairperson of 
the committee. In addition, Ms. Franklin contributed to the en­
hancement of audit quality through her service as a member of the 
AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board Planning Committee, as a public 
member of the AICPA’s Board of Directors, and as chairperson of its 
audit committee.
Oversight o f the Peer Review Process
Because the Board believes the peer review process is the foundation 
for the Section’s self-regulatory program, it monitors that process 
closely. The Board and its staff closely monitor not only the perform­
ance of the Peer Review Committee in setting standards and process­
ing reports, but also the performance of independent peer review 
teams as they comprehensively review the appropriateness of the 
quality control systems of member firms and compliance by the 
firms’ personnel with stated policies and procedures.
One or more Board members and staff members of the Board 
attended the meetings of the Peer Review Committee. The Peer 
Review Committee evaluates each report to determine whether the 
review team appropriately applied peer review standards. Each eval­
uation is based in part on the review, conducted by the committee’s 
staff members, of some or all of the review team’s workpapers and 
reports. In addition, the Board actively monitors the committee’s 
follow-up of corrective actions.
Peer Review Oversight Activities
The Board’s oversight of the peer review process involves staff re­
view of every peer review performed by the Section, pursuant to one 
of the POB’s three oversight programs. These programs, which are 
designed to evaluate whether the reviews were properly done in 
compliance with peer review performance and reporting standards, 
are as follows:
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Visitation and Workpaper Review Program. This involves 
observation of the performance of field work, attendance at the 
exit conference during which the review team reports its findings 
and recommendations to the management of the reviewed firm, 
and review of the review team’s workpapers and reports and the 
reviewed firm’s response.
Workpaper Review Program. This consists of the review of the 
review team’s workpapers and reports and the firm’s response. 
Report Review Program . This entails review of selected portions 
of the review team ’s workpapers, its reports, and the firm ’s 
response.
The SEC, through the office of its Chief Accountant, oversees 
the peer review process and POB oversight of the process. The 
SEC’s inspection of the 1991 peer reviews is substantially complete, 
and the Board expects the SEC to again endorse the process in its 
annual report.
Commentary on Peer Review
During the 1991-92 year, 300 firms had their initial peer review. 
These peer reviews resulted in a 25% rate of qualified or adverse 
reports and the finding that over 5 % of peer reviewed audit engage­
ments were seriously flawed. Consequently, the firms involved were 
required to undertake substantial corrective measures to improve 
their quality of practice and eliminate the deficiencies on the flawed 
engagements. Since the inception of the peer review program in 
1977, firms undergoing reviews subsequent to their initial review 
have had a 7% rate of qualified and adverse reports and a percentage 
of flawed engagements approximating 1%. The high rate of qualified 
or adverse reports for first time reviews indicates clearly the wisdom 
of the AICPA in requiring that all firms with AICPA members which 
audit publicly-held companies must join the SECPS. The contrast 
with the number of qualified or adverse reports and flawed engage­
ments resulting from subsequent reviews indicates plainly the reme­
dial benefits of the peer review program.
The Board identified two areas of concern in its 1990-91 annual 
report: the length of time taken to process certain reviews and 
the clarity of peer review letters of comments in communicating 
review findings.
The Board’s staff worked closely with the Peer Review Committee 
and its staff in developing a system to identify, on a timely basis, those 
peer reviews with issues that may be difficult to resolve. This year in 
those cases, active intervention by committee members resulted in 
more timely resolution of problems and the identification of corrective 
actions. Unfortunately, the system employed by the committee and its 
staff to monitor whether these firms had timely taken the required 
actions was not as effective. We urge the committee to implement a 
more effective monitoring system to avoid the possibility of delay by 
firms in taking required corrective action in the future.
The Peer Review Committee has formed a task force to consider 
the Board’s concerns about the clarity of letters of comments. Sev­
eral meetings attended by the Board’s staff have been held. The 
Board urges that reconsideration of the standards for preparing 
letters of comments be completed expeditiously.
Oversight o f the Quality Control Inquiry Process
The quality control inquiry process supplements the peer review 
process. It is administered by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee 
(QCIC), which reviews all litigation and government proceedings 
that allege a firm did not perform an audit of a publicly-held com­
pany in accordance with professional standards. A copy of each 
complaint alleging such substandard performance by a member firm 
is required to be reported to the QCIC. The QCIC’s task is to deter­
mine whether the allegations indicate possible deficiencies in the 
firm’s quality controls. In addition, the QCIC’s job is to analyze such
11/1 /1 979 7 /1 /1 9 9 1
Results o f QCIC A ctiv ity
through
6 /3 0 /1 9 9 1
through
6 /3 0 /1 9 9 2 Totals
Actions Related to Firms:
Either a special review was made, 
the firm's regularly scheduled peer 
review or inspection was expanded, or
other relevant work was inspected........ ..45 7 52
A firm took appropriate corrective 
measures that were responsive to 
the implications o f the 
specific case ...................................... ..61 10 71
Actions Related to Standards
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies 
were asked to consider the need for 
changes in, or guidance on, professional 
standards. ......................................... ..39 1 40
Actions Related to Individuals
The case referred to the AICPA 
Professional Ethics Division with a 
recommendation for investigation into 
work o f specific individuals.................. .. 16 4 20
Total 161 22 183
(Note: Frequently more than one action is  taken by the QCIC o r by the firm .)
litigation to determine whether professional standards, quality 
control standards, or the Section’s membership requirements need 
revision or whether additional guidance is needed.
The Board monitors the activities of the QCIC and has unre­
stricted access to the committee’s files as well as to all meetings of 
the committee and its task forces. The Board’s staff reads the com­
plaint, pertinent financial statements, other public documents, and 
relevant professional literature for each reported case. During the 
1991-92 year, all QCIC meetings were attended by one or more Board 
members and staff. Additionally, the Board’s staff actively partici­
pated in virtually all of the forty QCIC task force meetings with 
representatives of the firms reporting litigation. The Board receives 
reports from its staff on the activity concerning each case to evaluate 
whether the QCIC properly fulfills its responsibilities. Based on these 
activities, the Board believes that appropriate consideration was 
given to the 41 cases closed this year, and that the QCIC adequately 
complements the peer review process.
The SEC also oversees the QCIC process and the POB oversight of 
it. For each closed case, the SEC is provided with a “ closed case 
summary” which describes the allegations and the quality control 
implications thereof and the actions taken by the QCIC to ascertain 
whether there are shortcomings in the firm’s quality controls or 
compliance therewith. In addition, the SEC is provided with the 
POB’s oversight program and the POB and QCIC staff meet with the 
staff of the Office of the Chief Accountant to provide further infor­
mation if necessary to indicate the basis for QCIC’s conclusions 
concerning the adequacy of quality controls. While SEC staff review 
of cases closed in 1991-92 has not yet been completed, preliminary 
indications are that the SEC continues to be satisfied with the QCIC 
process as a complement to the peer review process.
Commentary on the QCIC
At the end of last year, the Board had identified several initiatives to 
improve the effectiveness of QCIC activities and had communicated 
these to the QCIC chairman. In particular, the Board recommended 
that prior to meeting with representatives of a firm reporting litiga­
tion, the QCIC staff should obtain sufficient data about the firm’s 
quality controls and the environment in which the allegedly faulty 
audit was conducted to enable the committee to conduct its inquiry
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more efficiently and effectively. The Board also urged the QCIC to 
more frequently inspect selected audit workpaper documentation to 
corroborate firm representations and to review firm guidance in 
areas relating to the allegations rather than rely on general descrip­
tions of it. The QCIC activity in 1991-92 reflected implementation of 
these recommendations.
During the year, the QCIC increased its access to the workpapers 
of contested engagements by reviewing portions of the workpapers 
relating to eight allegedly faulty audits. Additionally, for five other 
engagements QCIC task forces met with engagement supervisory 
personnel to obtain a firsthand understanding of the audit environ­
ment in which the audit was performed and the extent to which the 
audit plan responded to it. These investigatory procedures increase
the effectiveness of the QCIC process. The Board urges the commit­
tee to continue this trend.
In the year ended June 30, 1991, the QCIC formulated a policy 
that requires the review, in certain circumstances, of other engage­
ments performed by individuals who supervised the allegedly faulty 
audit to determine if any corrective action is needed to improve 
compliance with or design of quality controls. In four instances, 
cases were closed in the current year based in part on knowledge the 
QCIC obtained on screening documentation of the findings of re­
cently completed internal reviews. However, the QCIC did not par­
ticipate in the planning or the conduct of any of these internal 
reviews. To be most effective, the Board believes the committee 
should have such involvement.
POB Commentary on the Accounting Profession
While the POB's form al charter is to oversee the activities o f the SECPS, the Board also recognizes its  responsibility to m onitor and, when appropriate, to comment 
on matters that may affect the integrity o f the audit process and the credibility o f financial statements. The Board believes it  would il l serve the public interest i f  
the quality control process were a model o f efficiency and in tegrity while other forces and circumstances destroyed the profession's or the public's confidence in  it. 
Hence, we feel constrained to include in this report the follow ing comments.
The liability crisis that now threatens the survival of the accounting 
profession as we know it carries with it equally ominous concerns 
about its effects on the future reliability of financial reporting and 
capital formation. The following portions of a recent speech by our 
Chairman A. A. Sommer, J r . , delivered at the annual meeting of the 
American Accounting Association, addresses these concerns in the 
context of a tentative proposal the POB is presently researching, 
along with many others, in its reevaluation of the effectiveness of 
the profession’s self-regulatory programs. As mentioned earlier, the 
POB will issue a special report early next year that will not only 
address the liability crisis, but will also include the results of its 
research and specific recommendations about regulation of the ac­
counting profession and other means to improve the attest function.
The present litigation crisis in the profession is, in the eyes of 
many, life-threatening to one or more of the major firms; it has 
already contributed heavily to the demise of one of the larger 
firms, leaving innumerable human tragedies in its wake. God 
willing that will not be the fate of the thousands who depend 
upon any one of the major firms. The POB has at a recent ex­
tended meeting determined it will lend its support to the effort to 
secure the enactment of legislation that will restore the balance 
between accountability and liability because it believes that is 
fair and because we believe it is in the public interest.
The Board has taken this position in part because of the very 
topic we are focussing upon - accountability. The Board, and I 
believe all of us, believe that a person, a body, an entity should be 
accountable for its conduct; by the same token, it should not be 
accountable for someone else’s conduct. The fault in our litiga­
tion system today as it affects auditors is that too often they are 
held accountable for someone else’s failures and shortcomings 
and accountability faults. Auditors, as I have indicated earlier, 
should be accountable for the harm caused when they fail to meet 
their responsibilities, but they should not be accountable for the 
frauds, the failures, the shortcomings of others, and for, yes, the 
failures of government policies.
However, I have a further concern that I think is shared by 
the other members of the Board. That is that the present crisis 
has so dominated the thinking of leaders of the profession that it 
has left no time, no energy, no desire to think beyond the present 
legislative agenda and tackle the other rough problems that con­
front the profession. I mentioned a moment ago the very small 
number of failed audits. That statistic, of which the profession
can justly be proud, however, must not breed a complacency 
or satisfaction.
The safety statistics of the airline industry are even more 
impressive and one of the reasons may be the way in which 
failures in that industry are dealt with. When there is a crash 
there is a painstaking investigation of the tragedy by the National 
Transportation Safety Board. The findings and conclusions of the 
Board are not admissible in any proceeding, thus the Board is not 
inhibited by the airlines’ liability concerns from studying the 
evidence and publishing a report. And often significant new safe­
guards are mandated as a result of these reports: no smoking in 
lavatories, improved deicing procedures, indicator lights in the 
aisles - all these safety measures were the results of such investi­
gations. The extremely low incidence of failure does not make 
the typical airline executive depart a whit from his or her com­
mitment to ze ro  failures.
I think that if the profession is able to secure legislative relief 
from the laws that today make its members often accountable for 
wrongs they did not commit and if it were able to secure appropri­
ate legislation, similar to that governing the NTSB, barring the 
introduction of the report in any proceeding, it should, within the 
structure of the SEC Practice Section, consider amending the char­
ter of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee, which presently 
limits that body’s inquiry to whether the allegations in cases re­
ported suggest a flaw in the accused firm’s quality controls or 
compliance with them, or a fault in the profession’s standards, to 
permit inquiry into whether indeed there was a failed audit, and if 
there was, the reasons for it. Thus, like the National Transporta­
tion Safety Board, skilled and experienced auditors and insightful 
academics would examine the records of the firm to determine 
whether the allegations reported to the QCIC indicate there may 
have been a faulty audit, if so what caused it, what measures 
should be taken by the profession to avoid a recurrence, how 
similar problems can be avoided in the future. The entire airline 
industry learns from the NTSB inquiries; the entire accounting 
profession could learn from a similar inquiry into audit failures.
This will strike many as a radical proposal. The accounting 
profession today, sadly, is litigation driven. Any proposal looking 
toward reform is viewed with suspicion by the firms and their 
counsel - and as a lawyer, I can certainly understand their con­
servatism and their concern. It may be that to achieve the objec­
tive of such an inquiry without unduly burdening the firms this
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proposal would need to be refined. The Board stands ready to 
discuss those refinements. But I urge the firms and their counsel 
to understand how imperative it is that the profession, notwith­
standing the urgency and reality of the litigation crisis, see this 
proposal as a powerful means of identifying the problems which 
are creating the present crisis of confidence the profession is 
experiencing and remedying them.
There is so much to be considered, so much to be done. Gene 
Freedman, the head of Coopers and Lybrand, was quoted as saying 
the accounting profession must accept the fact that it must accept 
more responsibility. That is true. Like it or not, auditors are going 
to be more responsible for opining on internal controls; they are 
going to be called upon to be more vigorous in pursuing fraud; they 
are going to be under a stronger mandate to see to it that hanky-
panky is not hidden or concealed. They are going to accept some 
measure of mark-to-market accounting or have it shoved down 
their throats. And they must examine with the rigor of a skilled 
pathologist what has brought on the present crisis. Is it accounting 
principles? Is it audit procedures? Is it timidity in the face of de­
manding clients? Is it excessive competition? Is it the erosion of 
professionalism? Is it the historic form in which financial state­
ments and the opinions on them are cast? Is it the increased com­
plexity of financial transactions? Is it difficulty in training people to 
deal with this complexity? These questions cry out for answers. In 
finding those answers all of you can, through research and dia­
logue among yourselves, make enormous contributions, and I urge 
you most strongly to renew and reinvigorate your efforts to find 
those answers.
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